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EQUITY LAW FOR CLINIC ADVOCATES:

THE 1996 YEAR IN REVIEW
JUDITH KEENE*

RtSUMf

Cet article examine les dfveloppements survenus en 1996 en ce qui a trait Adeux
domaines de la jurisprudence en mati~re d'dquitd. I1 6tudie le droit substantiel
en vertu de 1'article 15 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertds et des lois
f6ddrales et provinciales en mati~re des droits de la personne de m~me que des
questions reli~es aux procedures et aux juridictions lors de l'affirmation des
droits d'dquit6 des clients. Dans cet article, on discute aussi bri6vement du
contexte dans lequel prennent place les litiges d'int6r& public en tant que
compldment kune solide organisation communautaire et des efforts en mati~re
de rdforme du droit.

INTRODUCTION

This article reviews developments in 1996 with respect to two areas of equity
jurisprudence. It will examine the substantive law under section 15 of the
CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms and federal/provincial human rights
legislation, in addition to the jurisdictional and procedural issues involved in
asserting clients' equity rights. The article also includes a brief discussion of the
context in which public interest litigation takes place, as an adjunct to strong
community organization and law reform efforts.
This article is organized under the following three headings:
I.

Recent equity jurisprudence

II.

How to get there from here: procedural issues relevant to achieving
legal remedies

III.

Litigation is not enough: the importance of maintaining a variety of
strategies for promoting equality rights

*
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I.
RECENT EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
As noted in a last year's review article,1 the Supreme Court of Canada repeatedly
pointed to human rights law as an aid in the analysis of section 15 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2 In Andrews v. Law Society of

British Columbia,3 Justice McIntyre addressed the definition of discrimination
under section 15 with reference to the law as developed under federal and

provincial human rights legislation. He stated that discrimination under section
15 would "be of the same nature and in descriptive terms will fit the concept of
discrimination developed under the Human Rights Acts". 4 The principles which
had been applied under that legislation were "equally applicable in considering
questions of discrimination under s. 15(1)".5 For this reason, the review below
will be organized by subject, rather than whether the equity argument was made
under section 15 of the Charter,or under human rights legislation.
A.

Social Assistance

1.
Aged-based welfare restrictions
The constitutionality of three major age restrictions in Ontario welfare regulations was litigated in 1996.
(a)

Ineligibility of applicantsunder 16 year of age

In February 1996, the Ontario Divisional Court released its long awaited
decision in Mohamed v. Metropolitan Toronto.6 The appellant was a 15-year-old
Somali refugee without family in Canada who had applied for General Welfare
Assistance and was determined categorically ineligible because of her age. The
Court accepted that the denial itself constituted a prima facie violation of
subsection 15(1), being discriminatory on the grounds of age, but found the law
justified under section 1. In particular, the Court found that the reasonableness
of the law had to be assessed in the context of all legislation dealing with the
care of children, including the Child and Family Services Act. 7 The Court

1.

2.

J. Keene, "Discrimination in the Provision of Government Services and s. 15 of the
Charter: Making the Best of the Judgements in Egan, Thibaudeau,and Miron" (1995)
11 J.L. & Soc. Pol'y. 107.
Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B of the CanadaAct, 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c.1 1 [hereinafter the Charter].

3.

[1989] 1 S.C.R. 143; 91 N.R. 255; 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [hereinafter cited to the D.L.R.].

4.

Ibid. 19.

5.

Ibid 18.

6.

(1996), 133 D.L.R. (4th) 108 (Ont.Div.C.).

7.

R.S.O. 1990, c.C.11.
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seemed particularly influenced by the fact that the Children's Aid Society was
prepared to take the appellant into care at all times, even though the appellant
did not want to be taken into care and there was no evidence that this was
desirable or necessary for her. The Court of Appeal has granted leave to appeal
8
this decision.
(b) Conditionaleligibility of those 16-18 years of age
Subsection 7(4) of the GeneralWelfare Assistance Act 9 prohibits a person over
16 but under 18 from receiving assistance as a single adult unless "special
circumstances" exist. In SARB L-09-21-43B, l0 the Ontario Social Assistance
Review Board'1 found no special circumstances but held that subsection 7(4)
violated section 15 of the Charter. The Ministry of Community and Social
12
Services has appealed the decision.
(c) Ineligibilityof those 18-21 years of age living at home
In at least three cases SARB has found that ineligibility for welfare of persons
between 18 and 21 living at home violates section 15 of the Charter.SARB has
ruled that paragraph (b) of the definition of "single person" in the General
WelfareAssistance Regulations13 violates the Charterinat least some situations.
The appellant in SARB K-10-13-2214 was a 20-year-old employable person
living with her parents. She was not dependent on them, a fact confirmed in a
previous SARB decision. SARB held that denial of benefits in these circumstances violated section 15 of the Charter. Even though Ministry counsel
conceded the violation and that it could not be saved by section 1, SARB held
that it could decide Charterissues on a case-by-case basis only as it has no
jurisdiction to find regulatory provision to be of no force or effect in all
circumstances. The decision therefore leaves open the question of whether the
section is constitutional in some circumstances with respect to "dependent
adults" of this age.
The second SARB decision holding that the definition of "single person" under
the regulations violates the Charter,SARB # L-08-20--15,15 involved an appel-

8.

(28 June 1996), Ont.C.A. Doc. CA M17869 [unreported].

9.

R.S.O. 1990, c.G.6.

10.

(27 May 1996; Soloman, Fyles, Shilling) [unreported].

11.

Hereinafter "SARB".

12.
13.
14.

Ontariov. Pyke (1996), Ont.Div.C. File No. 1154/96 [unreported].
R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 537, s.1(1).
(21 April, 1993; Bradbury, Novac) [unreported].

15.

(28 October 1993; McCormick, Martin) [unreported].
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lant whose parents received Family Benefits disability assistance and were not
entitled to an allowance for a dependent adult. As in the previous SARB decision
on this point, the Ministry conceded the violation.
In the third SARB decision on this point, the appellant was an employable
18-year-old who had left home but returned when she became pregnant. SARB
again held that the definition of "spouse" in subsection 1(1) of the regulations
violated section 15, but found it was saved by section 1 because the appellant
had been accepted back into her family home after a short period away. SARB
held that the objective of assessing the appellant's need for assistance in the
context of the family unit as a whole, while attempting to ensure that limited
resources are directed to those most in need, is of sufficient societal importance
to override a constitutionally protected right, as is the objective of ensuring that
the needs of young persons are met in a manner appropriate to their age and
16
circumstances. This decision is presently before the Ontario Divisional Court.
2.
Welfare cuts
On July 21, 1995, the Ontario government announced that social assistance
benefits would be decreased by 21.6% effective October 1, 1995. By Ontario
Regulations 384/95 and 385/95, the basic needs allowance and the maximum
shelter allowances under both the Family BenefitsAct 17 and the General Welfare

AssistanceAct were reduced by 21.6%.
In the last week of September 1995, twelve social assistance recipients applied
18
to the Ontario Divisional Court for judicial review of the rate cuts.
At the time the application was heard, two applicants were single unemployed
persons, one of whom was temporarily disabled and was acknowledged by the
Welfare Administrator as unable to seek work. Seven applicants were sole-support mothers with young children. One applicant was a married disabled person
with a spouse and two children. Two applicants were unemployed persons with
spouses, one of whom had three children (two with disabilities). The other
unemployed person with spouse had two children, one so severely disabled that
she was effectively the cause of her parents' unemployment. That child would
have to be cared for in a hospital critical care unit at a cost of approximately
$1,000.00 per day if, as foreseen, the cuts made it impossible for her parents to
meet the expenses of caring for her at home.

16.

McFarlanev. The Administrator,Departmentof Social Services, The Regional Munici-

pality of Peel (1996), Ont.Div.C. File No. 379/96 [unreported].
17.

R.S.O. 1990, c.F.2.

18.

Masse et al. v. Ontario(1996), 89 O.A.C. 81 (Div.C.).

Equity Law for Clinic Advocates

The uncontradicted evidence showed that all of the applicants had modest
accommodation at rents at or below the local average. The effect of the cuts was
such that, after rent was paid, the single disabled person had $3.00 per month,
the other single unemployed person had $20.00 per month, and the parents (each
household with an average of two children) had an average of $285 per month.
In each case, the left-over amount had to cover all other expenses: food, clothing,
fuel, utilities, telephone, health necessities and transportation.
The applicants argued that the rate cuts were ultravires the legislation, that they
contravened Ontario's undertaking under the CanadaAssistance Plan, and that
the they violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter. The section 7 argument
focused on the obvious threat to the applicants' security of the person. The
section 15 argument focused on the fact that the affected social assistance
recipients - a group in which temporarily disabled people, children, the aged,
and sole-support parents are grossly overrepresented - were being forced to
bear a disproportionate burden of government austerity measures compared to
other residents of Ontario.
The applicants applied for an interim order, on an emergency basis, to prohibit
the regulations from coming into effect on October 1. That part of the application
was unsuccessful. However, in her endorsement Justice Boland indicated that
she was "satisfied that there are serious issues to be tried involving constitutional
and administrative principles". She arranged for a special court to sit in early
November 1995 so that the full application for judicial review could be heard
by three judges of the Divisional Court.
Of the three-judge panel of the court, Justices O'Driscoll and O'Brien found in
favour of the government in respect of every argument. There was a partial
dissent by Justice Corbett. Each member of the panel wrote a lengthy and
difficult-to-follow judgement, and there was considerable disagreement as to
the reasons for even the concurring decisions.
Despite the fact that the cuts were done by regulation, Justice O'Driscoll found
that there was no government action that could attract constitutional scrutiny
under section 32 of the Charter.He also relied heavily on American jurisprudence to the effect that the state has no positive duties to its citizens.
Justice O'Brien said that it was unnecessary to deal with the "no government
action" argument. He seemed to suggest that section 7 could protect some
economic interests, but relied on other lower court decisions denying the right
to subsistence. He appeared to believe that poverty, rather than receipt of social
assistance, had been argued as a ground of discrimination. He seemed to find
that poverty could not be a ground "on this factual basis" because it is not
immutable.
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Justice Corbett agreed without reasons that there was no violation of section 7.
She did not comment on the main section 15 argument, but instead focused on
the fact that disabled and elderly people were treated differently under General
Welfare than they are on Family Benefits. She found this treatment discriminatory. She also noted that the government's apparent rationale for sparing disabled and elderly people from the cuts was that they cannot work. She noted
that sole-support parents with children of "pre-school age" (which she did not
define) also could not work, and concluded that failing to include this group
among those spared was discriminatory. Justice Corbett would have restored the
pre-cut level of entitlement to all members of these groups.
No member of the panel commented on the parenspatriae argument that had
been raised on behalf of affected children.
The main areas of agreement were a general disinclination to "interfere" with
the role of the legislature, and the adoption of a circular definition of the purpose
of the General Welfare Assistance Act and the Family Benefits Act: to provide

whatever amount Cabinet sets for whomever Cabinet says should get it.
Leave to appeal this decision was denied on April 30, 1996, with Justices
Finlayson, Carthy and McKinley of the Court of Appeal providing no reasons
for refusing leave. A subsequent application for leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada was dismissed by Chief Justice Lamer and Justices Gonthier
and Iacobucci, without reasons, on December 5, 1996.19
"Spouse in the house"
3.
The "spouse in the house" rule has traditionally been one of the most contentious
and litigated issues in social assistance law. In 1987, the Ontario government
promulgated a new regulatory definition of "spouse" under the General Welfare
Assistance Act and Family Benefits Act. These regulations reflected the settle-

ment of a Charterchallenge that had been brought against the old "spouse in
the house" rule in the mid-1980s by the Women's Legal Education and Action
Fund. A definition of "spouse" which was virtually identical to the pre-1987
Ontario definition was struck down by the Nova Scotia Supreme Court in R. v.
20

Rehberg.

The 1987 regulations provided a definition of "spouse" for social assistance
purposes that was in line with the FamilyLawAct 21 which provides that a couple
not otherwise deemed spouses because of marriage or parentage may cohabit
19.

(1996), S.C.J. No. 25462 [unreported].

20.

(1994), 127N.S.R.(2d) 331 (N.S.S.C.).

21.

R.S.O. 1990, c.F.3.
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for three years before the imposition of financial obligations. The 1987 regulations also provided that sexual factors were not to be considered when determining whether persons are spouses. When developing the 1987 rule, the Social
Assistance Review Committee - and ultimately the government- specifically
rejected a rule which would deem relationships to be spousal where there was
economic contribution from one person to another prior to three years of
cohabitation.
The 1987 definition was in effect in Ontario until October 1, 1995. As of that
date, clause (d) of the definition of "spouse" under section 1(1) of both the
General Welfare Assistance Regulations and the Family Benefits Regulations
was changed to read:
(d)

a person of the opposite sex to the applicant or recipient who is residing in the same dwelling place as the applicant or recipient if,
(i)

the person is providing financial support to the applicant or
recipient,

(ii)

the applicant or recipient is providing support to the person, or

(iii) the person and the applicant or recipient have a mutual agreement regarding their financial affairs, and
the social and familial aspects of the relationship between the person
22
and the applicant or recipient amount to cohabitation.
The regulations were also amended in October 1995 to impose a presumption
that two persons of the opposite sex are spouses whenever they live in the same
dwelling place, providing that
... unless the applicant or recipient provides evidence to satisfy the Director
to the contrary, it is presumed that if a person of the opposite sex to the
applicant or recipient is residing in the same dwelling place as the applicant
23
or recipient, the person is the spouse of the applicant or recipient.
Effective October 1, 1995, the government also amended the regulations under
the General Welfare AssistanceAct and the Family Benefits Act to provide that
no sole support parent could be eligible for social assistance unless he or she

22.

23.

Family Benefits Regulations, R.R.O. 1990, Reg.
409/95; General Welfare Assistance Regulations,
amended by Reg. 410/95.
Family Benefits Regulations, R.R.O. 1990, Reg.
409/95; General Welfare Assistance Regulations,
amended by Reg. 410/95.

366, s.l(1), as amended by Reg.
R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 537, s.l(1), as
366, s.l(3), as amended by Reg.
R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 537, s.l(3), as
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was living apart from his or her "spouse". "by reason of separation with no
'24
reasonable prospect of reconciliation.
Early in 1996, four sole-support mothers who were cut off Family Benefits
pursuant to the amendments filed an application for judicial review.
At the time each was disqualified, the women had been living in the same
residence with a man for less than one year. None of the men is the father of any
of the applicants' children, and none has any legal obligation to support the
woman or the children with whom they live. At the time each woman made the
decision to live with a co-resident, a vital consideration was whether she could
continue to receive subsistence income until she could become self-supporting
or until a new family was established. Each woman discussed the matter with
her welfare caseworker, making her decision based on the knowledge that she
could co-habit without losing her eligibility. The caseworker reduced each
woman's allowance, deeming the man to be contributing to household expenses,
but did not eliminate the allowance because the former rule allowed a three-year
period before "spousal" status was established.
The applicants in Falkineret al. v. Attorney General(Ontario)25 argued that the

amended regulations create a definition of spouse that can be satisfied with
evidence of "social and familial aspects of the relationship...(that) amount to
cohabitation". The new definition can be satisfied without the evidence of
economic support that had been held by the Court of Appeal 26 to be an essential
element of "cohabitation", because that aspect has been removed from consideration by the specific wording of section l(d)(iii). It would appear therefore
that no more than evidence of affection, service and the acceptance of mutual
duties (exclusive of economic support) is necessary for a situation to "amount
to cohabitation".
This argument was buttressed by evidence concerning the application of the
regulations, including affidavits from disabled recipients who had been disqualified because of living with a care-giver, or with a landlord of the opposite sex,
and from an elderly recipient who had been disqualified because he had given
shelter to his sister-in-law and her son when they were evicted from their
previous accommodation.
24.

Family Benefits Regulations, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 366, s.2(7)(b), as amended by Reg.
409/95; General Welfare Assistance Regulations, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 537, s.7(8), as
amended by Reg. 410/95.

25.

(29 October 1996), Ont.Div.C. File No. 810/95 [unreported].

26.

Re. Warwick and Minister of Community and Social Services (1978), 21 O.R. (2d) 528

(C.A.).
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The applicants also argued that the regulations breached the Ontario
Government's obligation under the Family Benefits Act and the GeneralWelfare
Assistance Act to provide assistance to persons in need. The applicants also
argued that the new rules violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.
The applicants argued that the new rules infringe section 7 for the following
reasons:
" the increased likelihood that social assistance recipients will be
charged with fraud under the Criminal Code on vague and ill-defined
grounds;
" the attendant privacy deprivation infringes their liberty and security of
the person;
" the amendments restrict the liberty and freedom of social assistant
recipients to form conjugal and non-conjugal relationships even
though these relationships may be in the best interests of the recipients
and their children; and
" the recipients are deprived of the basic means of subsistence and
therefore of their right to security of the person when attempting to
form relationships with people of the opposite sex, even though they
receive no support from these people and their basic needs remain
unchanged.
The applicants also argued that the government violated their rights under
section 7 by making the new rules apply even to those people who entered into
living arrangements relying on the old rule - which permitted them to live with
a person of the opposite sex for three years without affecting their benefits.
In respect of section 15, the applicants argued that the impugned amendments
discriminate against social assistance recipients, women (specifically poor
single mothers), and the children of social assistance recipients for the following
reasons:
" the new rules allocate social assistance benefits to needy persons on
the basis of a definition of "spouse" which does not apply to any other
group in society, a definition which is far broader than the definitions
of spouse used for the purposes of the Ontario Family Law Act and
virtually all other purposes, including tax laws;
" expert evidence showed that ninety-five percent of single parents on
social assistance are women, and that the new rules will force single
mothers, who already face the highest poverty rates of any group in
Canada, into greater economic dependence on men - while taking
away choice in their personal relationships; and
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* expert evidence also indicated that the financial consequences of the
new rules will be disastrous on children since they depend upon the
social assistance provided to their mothers; because of the chilling
affect of the new rules, many children will be deprived of the possibility of developing a new family relationship with an adult man.
A split decision was released October 30, 1996, with the majority (Justices
Borins and Saunders) dismissing the application on the basis that the applicants
lacked standing and that the application was premature. They did not express
an opinion on the merits of the Charter argument.
In dissent, Justice Rosenberg held that the case was properly before the Court
and, further, that the new definition violates section 15 of the Charter.He also
found that these violations were not "demonstrably justifiable in a free and
democratic society" and therefore could not be saved under section 1. Justice
Rosenberg criticized the government's arguments as to the meaning of the
regulation, and emphasized the basic fact that a "man in the house" under the
new regulations had no legal obligation to provide support and could not be
forced to provide support or to apply for welfare as part of a "family" unit.
Although the only justice who considered the merits of the case ruled the new
definition of "spouse" unconstitutional, because of the position of the majority
concerning procedure, thousands of households affected by the impugned
regulations must each bring appeals to SARB. To compound the problem, the
Court of Appeal has previously stated that SARB is entitled to no deference from
an appellate court even with respect to the interpretation of its own legislation
and regulations, 27 much less in regard to its opinions on constitutional questions. 28 People struggling to maintain subsistence will therefore be affected by
a seemingly unconstitutional regulation for years to come.29 Falkinerhas been
appealed.
4.
Constructive discrimination against disabled recipients
In 1996, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court rejected a Charter challenge to Family
30
Benefits regulation changes affecting disabled recipients. In Way v. Covert,
the disabled applicant had been receiving a shelter allowance while living with
her brother and sister-in-law. The regulations were amended to provide that a

27.

Wedekind v. Directorof Income Maintenance (1993), 62 O.A.C. 70; (1994), 21 O.R.
(3d) 289 (C.A.).

28.
29.

See discussion of Cooper v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) (21
November 1996), S.C.J. No. 24135 [unreported] in Part II below.
See discussion in Part II below.

30.

[1996] N.S.J. No. 358 (N.S.S.C.(T.D.)) [unreported].
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person living with a relative (as defined by the regulations) was not eligible for
a shelter allowance unless the relative's income fell below a prescribed level.
The applicant's brother was disabled, but the family exceeded the income cut-off
when his wife's income was included. Without the shelter allowance, the brother
and sister-in-law were unable to support the applicant and testified that she
would have to be institutionalized - at a far greater cost to the taxpayers. The
applicant argued that the effect of the regulation discriminated against her on
grounds of disability. Justice Gruchy rejected this argument, stating that the
disadvantage suffered "is not the result of her personal characteristics, but rather
by reason of her 'family income"'. He went on to hold - despite there being
no evidence to support the reasonableness of the regulation - that he could not
second-guess the government's decisions. He also rejected an argument that the
regulations were ultra vires Nova Scotia's Family Benefits Act.

In making this decision, the court illustrated a failure to understand the concept
of constructive discrimination. 3 1 Evidence adduced in this case - but not
referred to by the Court - showed that 80% of people affected by this regulatory
amendment were disabled. This was the basis for the adverse impact claim based
on disability. Way is under appeal.
5.
90-day residency requirement for social assistance
The British Columbia government has engaged in a very public dispute with the
federal government over a 90-day residency requirement before new entrants to
the province are eligible for social assistance. In the first round of legal
challenges to this decision, the British Columbia Supreme Court struck down
the regulation imposing the requirement as ultra vires the B.C. Guaranteed
Income ForNeed Act. 32 Justice Spencer held that even given a broad reading of
the purposes of the enabling legislation, it could not be read as permitting the
executive branch to discriminate against any class of "persons in need" it chose,
no matter the reason. Because of this finding, Justice Spencer did not rule on a
Charterargument advanced in the same case.
The British Columbia government has reintroduced this measure and it appears

that a further court challenge will proceed. The administrative law argument
relied on by Justice Spencer has been used in several cases in Ontario without
success, but it has never been unequivocally rejected. This decision raises the
possibility of further arguments of this nature.

31.
32.

Also referred to as "adverse effects" discrimination. See discussion in J. Keene, supra,
note 1.
FederatedAnti-Poverty Groups et al v. British Columbia (3 October 1996), (B.C.S.C.)
[unreported].
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B.

(Un)Employment Insurance

1.

Parental benefits

In Schafer v Canada(Attorney General),33 two Ontario couples challenged the
amended parental benefit provisions in the Unemployment InsuranceAct. 34 The

provisions authorized a total of twenty-five weeks combined maternal and
parental benefits, but limited adoptive parents to 10 weeks of benefits. Subsection 11(7) granted 5 weeks of additional benefits to an adopted child with a
medically-certified "condition", but only for children over the age of 6 months
at the time of adoption. Justice Cameron of the Ontario Court (General Division)
held that the provision of shorter leave to adoptive parents was discriminatory
and not saved by section 1.
The court held that the provisions denied equal benefit of the law to adoptive
parents and, indirectly, to adopted children. The court held that status as an
adoptive parent or adoptive child were analogous grounds (although finding the
status as an adoptive family was not), and that there was discrimination under
subsection 15(1) on grounds of age and status as an adoptive parent or child.
The discrimination was not saved by either subsection 15(2) or section 1. The
court rejected a section 15(2) argument, finding that even if maternity benefits
have as their object the amelioration of disadvantage to pregnant women and
women who have given birth, there was insufficient rational relationship
between the legislation and the cause of the disadvantage. 35 The court likewise
rejected the argument that a government program could be saved from section
1 scrutiny upon mere proof that it was directed toward ameliorating disadvantage.

36

The court ruled that the evidence established that maternity benefits were used
predominately for the care of children and family formation. Although the court
did not enlarge upon this point, it appears that, given the actual use of the benefit,
the government was expected to rationally justify a differentiation between
adoptive child care and family formation and care and family formation after
the birth of a child - and that it failed to do so.
The court ordered that subsection 11(7), the age limitation, be 'read out'. As for
the other provisions, the court ordered the 'reading in' of a phrase reflecting
adoption as well as pregnancy and birth. The court ordered that the 'reading in'
33.

(1996) 29 O.R. (3d) 496 (G.D.).

34.

R.S.C. 1985, c.U-1, as amended, ss. 11(3), 11(4) and 11(7).

35.

Supra, note 33 at 532.

36.

Ibid at 533.
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be suspended for ten months to provide Parliament with a reasonable opportunity to fashion its solution to the discrimination, noting the "complex legislative
scheme" of the Unemployment InsuranceAct.

2.
Sexual harassment as "just cause"
(Un)Employment Insurance Umpires and judges of the Federal Court of Appeal
have not been noted for their understanding of equity law. 37 An exception to this
general rule can be seen in the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Bell
v. Attorney General (Canada),38 where the court reviewed a case in which a

woman had left employment because of sexual harassment by her employer's
boyfriend. The Court noted that the Board of Referees, by requiring that there
be "urgency or necessity" for the employee to leave - and finding that the work
situation was not "so critical that she had no real option but to quit" - had
applied too stringent a test. In addition, the Board had never made a finding as
to whether sexual harassment had occurred. The matter was referred back to the
Board for rehearing.
C.

Canada Pension Plan

As with (Un)Employment Insurance, the appeal system under the Canada
Pension Plan3 9 is not noted for decisions that display any understanding of
equity law. There have been no notable exceptions this year.
1.
Survivors' benefits
To qualify for a survivor's benefit, a spouse must be over the age of 35, have
dependant children, or be disabled. This arbitrary age limit was challenged
unsuccessfully under section 15 in Law v The Minister of Employment and

Immigration.40 In its decision, the Pension Appeals Board 41 subjected age, an
enumerated ground of discrimination, to the type of analysis that had been
confined by the Supreme Court of Canada to unenumerated grounds, 4 2 and

37.

See, for example, the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada (Attorney
General) v. Faltermeier (1995), 128 D.L.R. (4th) 481, in which the Court failed to
appreciate the constructively discriminatory effect of s.14 on women who are unavailable for work because of an obligation to care for sick children.

38.

(1996), 195 N.R. 391 (F.C.A.).

39.

Hereinafter the "CPP".

40.

(1995), C.E.B. & P.G.R. # 8574; application for judicial review dismissed at (1996),
196 N.R. 73 (F.C.A.).

41.

Hereinafter the "PAB".

42.

See the remarks of Chief Justice Lamer in Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney
General)(1993), 158 N.R. 1 at 99 (S.C.C.).
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quoted but otherwise appeared not to apply Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence regarding the test for the application of section 15.
The PAB also imposed a more stringent test for age discrimination than for other
enumerated grounds, thus departing from the approach of the Supreme Court of
Canada. 4 3 The PAB also found that the impugned restrictions were justified
under section 1, although its rationale bears little resemblance to that indicated
by current Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Federal Court of Appeal found no
reviewable error.
2.
The effect of contribution rules on disabled persons
The disability pension scheme with the CPP is subject to contribution rules that
apply only in respect of disability pensions. It is arguable that these provisions
are discriminatory, contrary to section 15 of the Charter, as they impose a
disadvantage on disabled contributors not imposed on other contributors to the
CPP. Only disabled contributors are subject to a 'recency' test in that their
contributions must have been made within a certain time frame. Only disabled
contributors have their contributory period determined on the basis of a
"deemed" event (eg. the "deemed disability date") rather than an actual event
(eg. retirement, death, etc.).
The most recent decision case involving a section 15 challenge to CPP disability
provisions is Xinos v. Minister of National Health and Welfare.4" In that case,

the appellant had made CPP contributions from 1966 to 1978, but had not been
in Canada between 1979 and 1988. Shortly after returning to work in Canada in
1989, he was injured. He was denied benefits on the basis that he did not meet
minimum contributory requirements. The Charter challenge here focused on
the 'recency' test.
The PAB rejected the challenge, holding that while retirement benefits were
available to all contributors who met basic requirements (whether disabled or
not), disability benefits were additional benefits available only to the disabled
and therefore the view that the disabled were disadvantaged by the benefit
scheme could not be supported. In the alternative, the PAB held that any
violation of section 15 would be saved by section 1 as the different policy
objectives for retirement and disability pensions justified different contributory
requirements. It is instructive to compare the reasoning of the PAB in this
decision with that of the Supreme Court of Canada in Battlefords and District
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Co-operative Ltd. v Gibbs et al.,45 below. An application to the Federal Court
46
of Appeal for judicial review of Xinos has been filed.
D.
Workers' Compensation
In British Columbia, an appellant filed a section 15 challenge to a provision of
that province's Workers Compensation Act that denied the continuation of a
"widow's benefit" to widows who remarried or became involved in a "commonlaw relationship" prior to April 17, 1985. Spouses of both sexes who remarried
or lived with a partner after that date were not subject to disqualification. The
decision in Griggsv. British Columbia47 is notable for the court's struggle with
a matter which alleged more than one ground of discrimination. The grounds
cited Were sex, marital status and age, and the Griggs decision focused in
excruciating detail on the question of the correct ground of discrimination.
In relation to the claim of sex discrimination, the court found that the class of
affected individuals included "invalid men", and that "invalid men's" pensions
were not terminated upon their remarriage. 4 8 Astonishingly, the court declined
to consider this situation discriminatory, applying the "similarly situated" test
rejected by the Supreme Court in Andrews.
The court ruled that the discontinuation did not constitute age discrimination,
despite finding that the affected class was disproportionately older than those
receiving benefits today. The court appeared to have trouble, as did the court in
Law,49 accepting the Supreme Court's approach that age is an enumerated
ground, and that the application of section 15 is relatively straightforward in
such situations.
Ultimately, having rejected the claims of age and sex discrimination, the court
found discrimination on the basis of marital status.
The disentitling event predated the effective date of section 15 of the Charter;
however the court decided that this did not bar relief as the disqualification
created a continuing disadvantage that resulted in a "current violation". 50
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E.

Access to rentalaccommodation and services

1.
Last month's rent as constructive discrimination
A board of inquiry under the Ontario Human Rights Code51 has ruled that a
landlord breached the Code when he refused to rent to a complainant because
she was 16 years old, on welfare, and welfare refused to prepay last month's
rent.
In Garbett v Fisher,52 the complainant had been living on the street since she
was 13 because of the regulatory bar to persons under 16 obtaining welfare. She
planned to rent a place to live and return to school as soon as she turned 16.
After qualifying for General Welfare she and a friend, who was also on welfare,
viewed an apartment owned by Gustav Fisher. They completed an application
form and paid a deposit. Ms. Garbett then reported to her welfare worker, who
phoned Mr. Fisher to obtain details of the rental agreement. The worker testified
that Fisher asked if Welfare would pay the last month's rent. He was told that
Metro Toronto no longer provided last month's rent to welfare recipients. Fisher
said he had decided not to rent to Garbett because she was too young.
Ms. Garbett went to Fisher to try to persuade him to change his mind, or to get
back the deposit. Fisher called Garbett and her friend "bums", "thieves", and
"liars" and refused to return the deposit. Garbett eventually recovered the
deposit by suing in Small Claims Court.
The landlord gave evidence that he had rented to under-eighteen tenants and to
people on welfare in the past. The landlord gave three reasons for his refusal to
rent to Garbett: first, a claim (rejected by the board on a finding of fact) that the
complainant had stolen the deposit receipt without leaving a deposit; second,
that he had been advised that he should not rent to "under age" tenants without
obtaining the name of a guarantor; and third, that he had a policy'of requiring
last month's rent in advance to prevent financial loss.
In a decision that reflects an unusual understanding of the realities of life for
welfare recipients, the board found that age was one of the reasons for the
decision not to rent. In addition, the board pointed out that a policy of requiring
last month's rent, while not primafacie discriminatory, amounted to constructive discrimination in these circumstances because it had a disproportionately
adverse effect on welfare recipients. Ms. Garbett was awarded special damages
for loss arising out of the infringement and $2,500.00 for loss of dignity,
emotional suffering, and loss of the right to be free from discrimination.
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In contrast to the Griggs, the Garbett decision illustrates the familiarity of
human rights tribunals in dealing with multiple grounds of discrimination
without insistence on finding the reason for the respondent's actions.
Note that the Ontario government is attempting to legislatively restrict the
impact of human rights legislation on accommodation rights for poor people. In
its new and misleadingly-named Tenant Protection Act, it has proposed an
amendment to the Code that would allow landlords to use
in the manner prescribed under this Act income information, credit checks,
credit references, rental history, guarantees or other similar business practices which are prescribed in the regulations made under this Act in select53
ing prospective tenants.
It remains to be seen how this clause will appear in its final version and how it
will be interpreted.
2.
Insurance benefits: sexual orientation and disability discrimination
Two 1996 human rights decisions, both involving employees' insurance benefits
packages, are worthy of mention. In Ontario Human Rights Commission and
Dwyer v. Metropolitan Toronto,54 an Ontario human rights board of inquiry
ruled that the limitation of employee spousal benefits to spouses of the opposite
sex contravened both the Code and the Charter. The board found that the
definitions of "spouse" and "marital status" in the Code must be read down so
that they would not be confined to opposite-sex spouses.
Battlefords and District Co-operative Ltd. v. Gibbs et al.55 dealt with an
employment health insurance policy which provided income replacement for
mental disability which terminated after two years unless the recipient was
hospitalized. No such restriction was placed on persons unable to work because
of physical disability. A board of inquiry under Saskatchewan's human rights
legislation found the policy discriminatory. That decision was unanimously
upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada.
A major issue in Gibbs was how comparisons should be made in these circumstances. The employer made the following arguments:
* The plan treated all employees equally prior to the materialization of
risk of disability, in that they were all given similar protection from
future contingencies; therefore there was no discrimination.
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" The purpose of human rights legislation was to protect disabled persons from less favourable treatment than the able-bodied. Thus the
board of inquiry made the wrong comparison. Instead of comparing
the situation of employees unable to work because of physical disability with those unable to work because of mental disability, the board
should have considered all disabled employees as one class, comparing their situation with that of non-disabled employees.
" Protection against discrimination because of disability should be more
restrictively interpreted than other grounds because, while there is history
of invidious distinction between one race and another, between one sex
and another, and between one religion and another, there is no history of
disabled individuals treating other disabled individuals unfairly.
The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed all of the above arguments, comparing the situation of employees unable to work because of physical disability
and those unable to work because of mental disability. In doing so, the court
considered:
" that some human rights legislation (and section 15 of the Charter)
specifies both physical and mental disability;
" that there is a history of disadvantage to persons with mental disabilities; and
" that the court's own jurisprudence that holds that it is not necessary to
show that all persons bearing a relevant characteristic had been discriminated against to prove discrimination (discrimination against a
subset of a group - in this case persons with mental disabilities as a
subset of persons with disabilities - is sufficient).
With respect to the employer's last argument, the Supreme Court rejected any
assumption
that discrimination by one group against another within the prohibited classification is a prerequisite to protection under the Code...the object of the
Code is to protect against the application of stereotypical assumptions...by
anyone, regardless of whether that person shares those characteristics. 56

The court also considered the purpose of the plan, noting that it was to protect
employees against the income-related consequences of disability. It is worth
noting that the Supreme Court in Gibbs reiterated its position that human rights
legislation is quasi-constitutional, and therefore must be interpreted in a broad
and purposive manner. 57
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Education
3.
The appeal from Re. Eaton and Brant County Boardof Education58 was granted
unanimously by the Supreme Court of Canada this term. The reasons for the
decision have not been released as of the end of 1996.
II.

HOW TO GET THERE FROM HERE:

Procedural issues relevant to achieving legal remedies
Deciding how to frame a cause of action involving discrimination, and choosing
the appropriate tribunal, are obviously of great importance to the impoverished
client. Unnecessary delay can be devastating to a client litigating survival issues.
Moreover, unnecessary expense can result in a complete bar to having an issue
litigated. Choices concerning procedure are therefore of prime importance.
Unfortunately, two decisions released late in 1996 have made these procedural
choices even more difficult.
1.
Charter jurisdiction of administrative agencies and tribunals
In most administrative law schemes, there is an appeal as of right to a tribunal
from decisions of an administrative agency. In relatively few instances, the
agency itself acts as a 'gate-keeper', determining whether a matter will be
referred to a tribunal. The two major examples of such 'gate-keeping' agencies
are the federal and provincial human rights commissions.
In human rights legislation, rights are frequently subject to statutory limitations,
some of which are clearly constitutionally suspect. When a complainant presents
a prima facie case of discrimination that is only negated because of such an
exception, human rights commissions have, on occasion, referred the matter to
a tribunal. The tribunal would then decide both upon the merits of the complaint
and the constitutional validity of the exception. 59

Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission),

[1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114 at 1134. Note also that the Supreme Court has approved the use
of human rights legislation as an aid to the interpretation of other legislation. The court
has likewise indicated that human rights legislation is expected to prevail when legislation (or an instrument such as a trust document or a collective agreement) is either silent
or conflicts with human rights legislation: Simpson-Sears Ltd, supra, at 547, and Insurance Corporationof British Columbia v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 157.
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By virtue of a recent Supreme Court of Canada decision, the Canadian Human
Rights Commission was held not to have jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of provisions within its enabling statute. Although this jurisdictional
ruling does not extend to tribunals under the CanadianHuman Rights Act, 60 in
practice this means that Human Rights Tribunals will not be able to consider the
constitutional validity of most provisions within the act, because such cases will
not be referred to them by the Commission.
The provision at issue in Cooper v. Canada (CanadianHuman Rights Commission) 6 1 was subsection 15(c) of the CanadianHuman Rights Act which creates

an exception to the right against age discrimination to allow for compulsory
retirement where an employee has reached "the normal age of retirement for
employees working in [similar] positions". The Commission refused to refer to
a tribunal a complaint by a person who was "retired" at age 60. The complainant
applied for judicial review of the refusal. Ultimately, the matter reached the
Supreme Court. All parties, including the employer, took the position that the
Commission had at least a limited jurisdiction to question the constitutional
validity of its own act. A majority of the Supreme Court ruled otherwise.
The seven member panel of the Court split on the question. A six-member
plurality affirmed that administrative bodies have Charterjurisdiction according to the principles established in previous cases. However, the four who
delivered the majority decision appear to have adopted a conservative reading
of when an administrative body has the power to decide questions of law. They
held that the Commission did not have such power.
The immediate result of this decision is, of course, that counsel pursuing a case
involving a Charteroverride of a limiting provision in the CanadianHuman
Rights Act must go to court by way of an application for a declaration of
unconstitutionality, judicial review, or another form of action. While Cooper
does not immediately change the law on the Charterjurisdiction of other
administrative bodies, it may signal a more cautious approach to this issue
generally.
When assessing the course of action most economical and efficient in a case that
could go to an administrative tribunal or to court, counsel would do well to
compare the enabling legislation of the tribunal in question to the Canadian
Human Rights Act, because that is an important part of distinguishing the
situation in Cooper from any other case. It is worth remembering that the
complaint-handling and appeal-tribunal scheme set out in the CanadianHuman
60.
61.

R.S.C. 1985, c.H-6.
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Rights Act is significantly different in structure from other administrative law
systems, such as social assistance, CPP and Worker's Compensation appeals.
The Canadian Human Rights Commission is an investigative agency which also
performs a "gate-keeping" function, since it is only by a referral from the
Commission that a complaint can get to a tribunal. Thus, for such tribunals as
the Social Assistance Review Board, only the Court's remarks in Cooper about
tribunals would be directly relevant. Having said that, it still appears that the
Cooper decision adds to the uncertainty of assessing when an administrative
tribunal might be said to have Charterjurisdiction.
Justices LaForest, Sopinka, Gonthier and lacobucci held that the Commission
had no Charter jurisdiction because the Act contained no grant of power to the
Commission to consider general questions of law. They made this finding
despite acknowledging that the Commission:
" performs a "screening analysis somewhat analogous to that of a judge
62
at a preliminary inquiry";
" assesses the sufficiency of evidence before it in a complaint; 63 and
" must determine whether any complaint comes within federal jurisdic64
tion constitutionally.
The majority acknowledged that a human rights tribunal, as opposed to the
Commission, does decide questions of law and therefore has Charterjurisdiction in respect of some issues:
As with the Commission, there is no explicit power given to a Tribunal to
consider questions of law...ss.50(l) and 50(2) of the Act state that a tribunal

shall enquire into the complaint referred to it by the Commission to determine if it is substantiated. This is primarily and essentially a fact-finding
inquiry with the aim of establishing whether a discriminatory practice
occurred. In the course of such an inquiry a tribunal may indeed consider
questions of law...these questions will often centre around the interpretation
of the enabling legislation. However, unlike the Commission...a tribunal
posses a more general power to deal with questions of law. Thus tribunals
have been recognised as having jurisdiction to interpret statutes other than
the Act...and as having jurisdiction to consider constitutional questions
other than those noted above. In particular, it is well accepted that a tribunal
has the power to address questions on the constitutional division of powers.... on the validity of a ground of discrimination..., and it is foreseeable
that a tribunal could entertain Charterarguments on the constitutionality of
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available remedies in a particular case.... Even in such instances, however,
the legal findings of a tribunal receive no deference from the courts. 65
Chief Justice Lamer, who joined Justices LaForest, Sopinka, Gonthier and
Iacobucci in the result, argued that the whole issue of jurisdiction should be
66
revisited by the Court. He argued that previous cases, such as Cuddy Chicks,
were wrongly decided and that the jurisdiction to find laws to be unconstitutional
should be reserved exclusively to courts.
Justice McLachlin, writing in dissent for herself and Justice L'Heureux-Dub6,
had a more realistic view of what constitutes a question of law:
Questions of law encompass the meaning to be given to particular provis-

ions of the statute under which the tribunal acts. But other types of legal
questions may arise as well. There may be questions of conflicts between
the tribunal's constituent statute and other enactments. Or there may be
questions...of conflict between the tribunal's constituent statute and the fundamental law of the land, the Charter.67

Justice McLachlin considered specific sections of the Act68 in deciding that the
federal Commissions and tribunals could be understood to be empowered to
decide questions of law. With regard to the Commission, she observed that the
list of duties set out in section 27 shows that the Commission is not to be
considered a rubber stamp to the instructions of Parliament, since it has an
advisory reporting power to Parliament which includes reviewing and commenting on inconsistencies between the act and other federal laws and regulations.
She also noted that subsection 27(2), which empowers the Commission to issue
guidelines an the application of the act, expressly empowers the Commission to
interpret the act.
In relation to the Commission's complaint-handling function, Justice McLachlin
noted that the Commission must obviously apply its own guidelines in determining whether to refer a complaint to a tribunal, and that this also involved
interpreting questions of law.
Regarding the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, she maintained that section
50, which gives the tribunal power to receive evidence and submissions,
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"suggest[s] a full hearing extending beyond the facts to law", 69 and noted that
subsection 56(3) gives a review tribunal, which has all the powers of a tribunal,
70
jurisdiction to deal with an appeal "on any question of law or fact...".
It is probably safe to say that the majority of the Supreme Court have not
departed from the Cuddy Chicks line of cases. However, the narrow interpretation given by the majority to the term "question of law" may create unwelcome
uncertainty about the Charterjurisdiction of the more "minor" administrative
tribunals. The court's remarks concerning lack of deference also remind us, if
we needed reminding, that arguing Charterlaw before most of the administrative tribunals that govern the lives of the poor can be considered only a necessary
and time-consuming first step to an inevitable putting of the question before a
court.

2.
Access to judicial review
As discussed above, the majority in Falkiner71 held that the "spouse in the
house" application was premature and that the applicants did not have standing.
The applicants should first have taken their Charter argument, as well as any
72
statutory interpretation argument available to them, to SARB.

Justice Borins, who wrote the decision, held that the court should decline to
exercise its discretion to entertain the Charterchallenge for two reasons:
" because it was made in the context of an application for judicial
review. 73 It seems he felt that it could have been maintained as an
74
application under Rule 14.
" because the Charterchallenge was "characterized as a s.24(1) application for a remedy ... based on infringement or denial, by the

impugned Regulations, of the applicants' rights ... therefore to be distinguished from the case the court is asked to declare that legislation
per se limits rights and freedoms ... and is consequently of no force
and effect ... [per] ... s.52 ... a proceeding which is not dependant on

the infringement of the rights of an individual ... and which does not
69.
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The majority therefore expressed no opinion on the Charterissues. Justice'Rosenberg,
dissenting, disagreed with the majority on the exercise of their discretion to grant judicial review. He also went on to hold that both the new definition of "spouse" and the
"no reasonable prospect of reconciliation" rule violated section 15 of the Charter.
Supra, note 25 at 5.
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require, in that respect, a finding of fact. ... Whether any applicant is a
spouse involves a question of fact to be determined, on the basis of
evidence, by the tribunal. The court would benefit from allowing the
SARB to make the initial interpretation of the amended Regulations
75
and to determine the Charterissues raised by the Applicants."
Justice Borins presumably overlooked the applicants' invocation of section 52
in the pleadings.
Despite the eight volumes of evidence before the court, Justice Borins suggested
that they needed more evidence on what he called "adjudicative facts", although
he did not suggest what these might be.
Ignoring the fact that the Court of Appeal has expressed the view that SARB is
to be accorded no deference in the interpretation of its own legislation and
regulations, 7 6 much less in respect of Charterissues, Justice Borins opined that
the court should have the benefit of SARB's expertise, and cited Supreme Court
of Canada decisions in respect of expert tribunals.
77
Ignoring the jurisprudence concerning the absence of stare decisis at SARB
and the submissions concerning the number of recipients affected (over 10,000),
and the number of appeals that are at issue (several hundred at the time of the
hearing), Justice Borins made his ruling "in the absence of any showing that the
review process to the SARB...is inappropriate or less advantageous than the
78
judicial review jurisdiction of this court".

Having stated that the proper process was an appeal to SARB followed by an
appeal of the SARB decision to Divisional Court, Justice Borins proceeded to
indicate doubt as to whether Divisional Court could grant a section 24 remedy
79
in that event.
As a decision respecting factors to be considered when exercising jurisdiction
to grant judicial review, Falkineris obviously questionable. In addition, one
might question whether the court's decision would have been different in light
of the Supreme Court's confirmation, in Cooper, of the lack of deference to be
accorded Charterdecisions of an administrative tribunal.
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III. LITIGATION IS NOT ENOUGH: The importance of maintaining
a variety of strategies for promoting equality rights
As this article is mainly a review of litigation, it risks giving the impression that
litigation is the strategy for obtaining justice for the poor. Nothing could be
farther from the truth.
Litigation has always been a necessary adjunct to law reform activity, and,
certainly on the provincial level, the non-response by government to lobbying
efforts by and on behalf of the poor has necessitated litigation as the only
available strategy on some issues. The current provincial government has
ignored not only community organizations, but also government-commissioned
studies such as the Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee, the
Report on Systemic Racism in the Criminal Justice System, and the Cornish
Report on the Ontario Human Rights Commission. Efforts to communicate with
the government must be maintained, but other efforts, such as litigation, should
also be maintained. As of the date of this article, litigation is underway to defend
the right to equality in a number of government services and programs.
That said, the essential elements in any movement toward social change are
community organization and law reform activity. It is critically important that
they continue.
For advocates working with the poor in Ontario, 1996 has been an exhausting
year. In the name of fiscal responsibility, governments have deprived the poor
of modest gains previously made. Even more troubling is that politicians and
the mainstream media have fostered the belief that we cannot 'afford' to care
about the suffering of the least powerful in our society. The not-so-subtle subtext
is that people who lack money are poor because of some intrinsic inferiority.
Therefore, it is 'alright' if the poor are deprived of the necessities of life, either
because they do not deserve a decent standard of living, or because they would
not know how to handle it if they had it.
All of the above is strikingly and depressingly familiar to those who have studied
discrimination based on race, creed or ethnicity. Racism, sexism, religious
bigotry, homophobia, and abuse of people because they are poor are all part of
the same phenomenon. It therefore behooves advocates for poor people to
acknowledge the similarities, study the tactics used by other successful equityseeking groups, and encourage whole-community solidarity. In planning any
strategy, it can help to keep the following two points in mind.
First, because the current climate is very unfriendly to human rights issues,
myths abound and discrimination is often blatant. It is therefore very important
to engage in active 'myth-busting' and to publicize issues and successes.
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Second, oppressed communities are easily divided. 'Horizontal hostility' - the
tendency of oppressed people to blame themselves or scapegoat others who are
also oppressed - is a common reason why community initiatives fall apart.
Horizontal hostility can occur for a number of reasons. For example, people who
experience discrimination begin to believe the message that they are worthless.
Human nature being what it is, a person who feels worthless often finds comfort
by looking around for someone (or some group) who is 'even more worthless'.
It is more difficult and dangerous to fight a powerful oppressor than it is to 'take
out your frustrations' on someone less powerful than yourself. We all give in to
this temptation from time to time. Finally, we all have our areas of bigotry,
conscious or - more often -

unconscious.

It is essential to recognise the phenomenon of horizontal hostility and to discuss
it in advance with any community group formed to address a community
problem. It is also essential to continue to point out the problem when in-fighting
occurs, as a prelude to discussing and defusing it. Community groups only
succeed in solving a problem when they recognize their differences, resolve
them or agree to disagree, and concentrate on the goal.
Community organization and law reform activity have been hampered by the sheer
speed with which the provincial and federal governments are dismantling
essential services. In these difficult times, people working to maintain and
improve the quality of community life must maintain incredible patience and
tenacity.
Despite the discouraging trends of the times, there are community organizations
that are more active and strategic than ever. Their hard work, and the heroic
efforts of individual public interest litigants, who sacrifice much on behalf of
others in their situation, give us reason to hope that there will be more cheering
developments to report in 1997.

